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Federal Oversight of State
Primaries: The Troubling Drift
from Equal Protection to
Association
by Jacob Eisler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a dramatic
transformation in the degree and quality of federal judicial oversight of
the voting process. With the one-person, one-vote jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court of the United States imposed a basic requirement of
personal equality in district line-drawing. In the context of race,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot1 became the beachhead in the premise that racial
discrimination will not be tolerated in voting procedure. 2 A few decades
later, Davis v. Bandemer3 suggested that fair district line-drawing could
require non-discrimination on the grounds of party identification. 4 In
each of these domains of court-led intervention, one constitutional right
emerged as the linchpin: the Equal Protection Clause.5

*Associate Professor of Public Law, Southampton Law School. Many thanks to my
fellow symposium contributors, Lori Ringhand, Atiba Ellis, Tony Gaughan, Michael
Dimino, and Benjamin Cover; Gary Simson and Cathy Cox for facilitating the symposium;
the staff of the Mercer Law Review (particularly Maia Middleton and Sam Lyon); and
Gene Mazo and Jim Fleissner for helpful comments.
1. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2. Id. at 347.
3. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
4. Id. at 143. Of course, as Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), has
indicated, the quest to prevent partisan gerrymandering may well have been only sound
and fury, as a thin conservative majority deemed the practice non-justiciable; and before
the Supreme Court, no single partisan gerrymander was ever deemed unconstitutional
(including in Davis itself).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This is not to say this trend was immediately
apparent. The initial one-person one-vote jurisprudence did not clearly identify a
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Given the importance of party primaries in the process of voting, it is
not surprising that they have been a subject of federal judicial
oversight. Nor is the timing of the Supreme Court’s entry into the area
surprising; the topic was subject to broad judicial scrutiny shortly after
its boldest entry into the realm of democratic design with Baker v.
Carr.6 Yet the constitutional character of the intervention into
primaries has deviated from the general trend in the oversight of voting
process. As the modern jurisprudence of primary regulation has evolved
over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has come to focus almost
exclusively on the right to associate as the activated constitutional
interest. This has correlated with a focus on party integrity as the
dominant locus of consideration. The Court’s current approach has
reinforced the stranglehold that parties have on the political process, as
well as neglected a sufficiently broad analysis of the question at hand:
what conditions create desirable (or at least sufficiently viable)
primaries? This question in turn hangs upon the need for primaries
described above: to serve as an initial step that can effectively winnow
the slate of candidates, such that the final ballot and the intermediate
steps that precede it give all voters a fair choice.
This piece begins by establishing the historical drift towards
domination by associational rights. It observes that early jurisprudence
applied both equal protection and associational reasoning to the
constitutional review of primary design, but in the 1980s associational
rights emerged as the sole basis for review. The piece then explores the
substantive consequences and pathologies of the Court’s reasoning. In
particular the Court has come to protect parties, which are themselves
well-entrenched quasi-public entities in scant need of judicial
sympathy. It then culminates with the argument that a return to the
(much-contested) principle underlying the entry into the political
thicket itself, the Equal Protection Clause, provides a starting point for
helpfully broadening and diversifying the interrogation of primary
design. While far from a panacea (in particular because of the need to
avoid judicial over-determination of democratic autonomy), renewed
attentiveness to the Equal Protection Clause would push courts to
constitutional provision to support the principle, and it was only “[f]uture cases [that]
placed the right to vote squarely within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.” Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 89, 97 (2014). Likewise, it was only over time that the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Fifteenth, became the linchpin of the prohibition against racial
discrimination (as it was Justice Whittaker’s concurrence that invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment). See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 575 (2012).
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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consider the full breadth of possible legal interests invoked in primary
design. The Article concludes by exploring the broader question of
whether the Court best operates as another standard power player in
political contestation (a role supported by the invocation of associational
rights) or as a unique institution with a distinct capacity to transform
the unfolding of politics.
II. THE DRIFT TOWARDS ASSOCIATION IN THE LAW OF PRIMARY PARTY
AFFILIATION
The narrowing of legal imagination by the Supreme Court to wholly
focus on associational rights has occurred gradually. This reflects a
progression away from the initial foray into the political thicket, which
opened elections to broader judicial regulation on the basis of the equal
right to the political franchise. However, the first limitations the
Supreme Court imposed on primary design—like the first rules imposed
on drawing of district boundaries—7 enforced the Fifteenth
Amendment’s8 prohibition against race-based discriminatory voting
laws.9 In Smith v. Allwright,10 the Supreme Court held that the refusal
of the state electoral apparatus to deny a Black citizen access to a
primary ballot on account of race violated the Fifteenth Amendment; 11
in Terry v Adams,12 where a dominant political association held a
primary that determined official primary candidates (in effect, a
shadow primary), that association’s prohibition against black
participation was likewise unconstitutional. 13 Insofar as this line of
cases simply expresses the indubitable proposition that racial voting
restrictions are illegal, it does relatively little to inform the
contemporary law of primaries, which is directed towards terms of
partisan competition and appropriate conceptualization of political
identity. Yet the race-and-primary cases did establish an initial judicial
foray into the regulation of primaries, and Terry established the
principle that political associations (including parties) that perform
quasi-state functions can be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as
states themselves.14
7. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347–48.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
9. For a seminal history of the evolution of racial anti-discrimination law applied to
primaries, see LEON EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 174–79 (1986).
10. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
11. Id. at 666.
12. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
13. Id. at 470.
14. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339; Simith, 321 U.S. 649; Terry, 345 U.S. 461.
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Fifteen years after Terry and in the wake of the foray into the
political thicket with the one-person, one-vote jurisprudence,15 the
modern lineage16 of Supreme Court primary regulation began with
Williams v. Rhodes.17 The state election laws at issue made it almost
impossible for minor parties to gain access to the final state ballot for
presidential elections, in large part because status as a new party with
ballot access required a number of signatures equal to 15% of the
number of ballots cast in the previous gubernatorial election, followed
by the holding of a highly structured party primary. The Supreme
Court deemed the regulations to infringe the right to an effective vote
protected by the Equal Protection Clause as well as the right to realize
political association protected by the First Amendment. 18 The
higher-order argument advanced by the state—that states have a
constitutional remit to design elections as they choose—19 was
categorically struck down, effectively a prerequisite for this type of
judicial intervention. The more practical claim that the extensive
restrictions on party formation were served by compelling interests—
advancing the stability afforded by a two-party system, but also more
generally ensuring administrability of the electoral system—20was also
rejected. The Court refused to accept that two parties should have a
monopoly on power, and concluded that general administrability failed
to justify the extensiveness of the “burden on voting and associational
rights” effected by the measures. 21 In a case driven by similar
substantive concerns, Bullock v. Carter,22 the Court likewise deemed
prohibitively high filing fees for candidate access to the primary ballot
to be a violation of equal liberty. 23 However, the Court would soon
thereafter confirm in Jenness v. Fortson24 that general administrability
considerations can justify a rule that restricts the candidates on a ballot

15. Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
16. See Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive Ballot
Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition in the United States, 29 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 407, 424 (2006) (observing that while there had been one Supreme Court case
regarding ballot access, MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), it has largely been left
behind by precedent; moreover it was overruled in part by a case that implemented
one-person one-vote, Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)).
17. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
19. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2; Williams, 393 U.S. at 28–29.
20. Williams, 393 U.S at 31–32.
21. Id. at 34.
22. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
23. Id.
24. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
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to a reasonable number, and that laws justified by such reasons will
survive judicial review when the constitutional burden is not too great.
In Jenness, a state law required a non-major-party candidate to submit
a petition signed by 5% of eligible voters to gain access to a statewide
general election ballot.25 This effectively served as an alternative to
winning a party primary as a mechanism for gaining general ballot
access. The law was deemed to pass equal protection and associational
muster, in part because the requirements were less onerous26 than
those at issue in Williams and in part because the regulations advanced
other interests—such as maintaining a manageable general ballot—on
reasonable terms.27
These early cases on the opportunities of candidates to gain access to
ballots could easily be understood as raising concerns that are
fundamentally associational. Reasonable access to elections provides a
critical mechanism by which groups of voters can realize their collective
political potential; measures that unreasonably obstruct this are thus a
clear violation of associational rights. Yet the Court relied on both the
broader right to equal voting power as well as associational rights;
indeed, in Bullock, it characterized deprivation of access to the ballot
wholly as an equal protection wrong.28 The predilection for invoking the
Fourteenth Amendment29 may be reflective of the historical proximity
to judicial fashioning of the one-person, one-vote principle (which
invoked the Equal Protection Clause to justify the court’s entry into the
political thicket), but regardless it is reflective of the character of the
Court’s reasoning during its early reviews of primary regulation. Such
an approach tended to inspire the Court to make more systemically
general enquiries. The question was not merely if voters were harmed
specifically in their capacity as members of associations, but if the
constraining effects of the legislation generally fit the political end it
allegedly served; ensuring fair and legitimate access to the democratic
process.30

25. Id. at 432.
26. In particular, unlike the electoral scheme at issue in Williams, in Jenness there
were no restrictions on write-in votes. 403 U.S. at 438.
27. Id. at 442.
28. 405 U.S. at 141. Indeed, the Court’s own reasoning teed it up for an associational
wrong when it observed “laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.” Id. at 143.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30. Williams, 393 U.S. at 34 (looking to the “totality” of the restrictive effect of laws
to determine if the cost is justified by political circumstances); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146
(monetary constraints through filing limits “ill-fitting” to winnowing of candidates).
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Subsequent cases continued to balance constitutional rights against
asserted state interests in administrability and political welfare, but
began to subtly structure its queries around associational harms. This
proclivity for associational analysis alone came at the cost of reducing
the comprehensiveness of the Court’s analysis, a point apparent in a
pair of 1970s cases concerned with advance party registration
requirements. In Rosario v. Rockefeller,31 the Court permitted a
restriction that required party registration thirty days prior to the
preceding general election to vote in the subsequent primary because of
the benefit of preventing “raiding” by voters who are not genuinely
members of a party to shift the primary outcome. 32 Even though such
time limits impose some burden on the ability of voters to influence
primaries of their choice, the Court found the advance registration in
Rosario to be neither an equal protection violation of the franchise nor a
heavy burden upon the opportunity to associate.33 Yet in Kusper v.
Pontikes,34 a statute that prohibited a voter from participating in the
primary of a new party for twenty-three months after voting in the
primary of another party was found to illegitimately infringe
associational rights (but did not make the same enquiry into general
access to the electoral franchise). The Court treated the law at issue in
Kusper as substantively dissimilar from that in Rosario, insofar as it
required voters to skip participating in at least one primary before
realizing the full participatory benefits of the new party affiliation (that
is, voting in a primary).35 Yet, if limited to the associational question,
the Court’s differentiation between these cases is structurally specious.
The laws at issue in both Rosario and Kusper balance the same
competing interests of voters’ wish to participate and affiliate freely
against the benefit of constraining party participation to genuinely
committed voters. Kusper merely strikes a different (and starker)
balance; one could argue that a “tax” of one primary to switch party
affiliation would simply confer a more intense version of the associative
benefit that allows the law at issue in Rosario to survive. In effect, the
distinction between the two cases—decided within a year of each
other—appears arbitrary, even aesthetic, if asked wholly as a question
of associational legitimacy. It seems as though an authoritative answer
requires a more foundational query: how does one set of primary
designs serve the ends not merely of party association, but of fair
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

410 U.S. 752 (1973).
Id. at 761.
Id. at 760.
414 U.S. 51 (1973).
Id. at 60–61.
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democratic process (and particularly equal opportunities of voters to
influence such process)? The outcomes of the cases may well remain the
same under this more generalized analysis—the regulation at issue in
Kusper did more aggressively constrain flexible franchise access, and
this could be seen as upsetting equal voting rights—but considering
equal protection reasoning as well as associational effect would more
fully capture the political stakes at issue.
The Court’s preference for associational analysis would soon be made
explicit, and would ironically make the virtue of equal protection’s
substantive impulse a vice. In Storer v. Brown,36 the Court faced the
parallel question with regards to independent candidates: what general
thresholds might be demanded of them before they can access the
general ballot? In Storer, the Court upheld a state regulation that
required a one-year disaffiliation from another party before a candidate
could run as an independent candidate. 37 Because of the
anti-splintering, factionalism-inhibiting benefit of the regulation, the
law survived challenges under both the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. The state interest evoked clearly bears on the
associational question—the law prevents disgruntled party members
from breaking off and running as independents, and thus confers a
benefit that bears directly on the associational question—but the equal
protection question is more slippery. Does such a limitation impair
equal franchise power for some (marginal) party members? The
challenge of that query perhaps led the Court in Storer to make a
statement that anticipated the coming disfavoring of the Equal
Protection Clause in primary jurisprudence:
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election
laws would fail to pass muster under our cases; and the rule
fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific
provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for
separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are
invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not
self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must
be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a
“matter of degree.”38

36. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
37. Id. at 733–34.
38. Id. at 730 (internal citation omitted). For a critique of ‘sore loser’ laws such as
those upheld in Storer, see Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic
Contestation, 99 GEO. L. J. 1013 (2011).
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This statement suggests the challenging nature of applying the
Equal Protection Clause to judicial review of electoral process. Courts
face an abstract and challenging task in determining what are
minimally satisfactory electoral rules from an equality standpoint,
particularly since the very point of democratic politics is to select
majoritarian winners and losers. Determining if equality of voter liberty
is excessively burdened by the statutory design of the electoral process
(unless the regulation is of an explicitly unconstitutional character,
such as racially discriminatory statutes) seems like an inevitably
substantive query. Courts can only perform the analysis by adverting to
a substantive theory of just, popular self-rule. It may be this quality
that has led to a preference for using the more conceptually tractable
associational right for querying the nature of primary design. The
concept of unburdened association, at least, can be analyzed with some
degree of isolation from the demand for a broader concept of politics.
The affinity for associational analysis seemed to reach high tide in
Cousins v. Wigoda39 and Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. La Follette,40
in which the Court, pointing to associational rights, concluded that
party autonomy trumps state law in determining the rules by which
state delegates are seated at a national party convention. While the
associational right is certainly the appropriate legal gloss for
challenging the laws at issue, the Court’s unflinching rejection of the
countervailing interests of ensuring suffrage 41 or prohibiting “unwise or
irrational”42 practice suggests the degree to which associational
interests had become the touchstone for judicial review of primaries.
Thus, the constitutional inquiry into primaries has become dominated
by a question that lends itself to the protection of voters organized into
institutions, rather than the independent query as to the liberty
afforded individual voters, or more general political efficacy as a matter
of collective interest. In the thematically related Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee,43 the Supreme Court struck
down internal state regulations of party matters (such as internal
endorsements in primaries), on similar grounds of democratic self–
determination.44
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court turned to the issue that has
been most prominent in contemporary primary regulation—the degree
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

419 U.S. 477 (1975).
450 U.S. 107 (1981).
Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489.
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124.
489 U.S. 214 (1989).
Id. at 233.
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to which states may dictate to parties the political affiliation of voters in
primary participation—the associational interest had emerged as
dominant. The seminal question has been if states may impose voter
affiliation requirements with regards to primary participation. There is
a dizzying array of such alternatives. Under a closed primary, only
those voters who are members of the party holding the primary may
vote on nominees. Under an open primary, a voter may select primary
candidates for any party, but can only select one candidate from all
offices, and thus is committed to having a voice in the nominees for only
one party.45 In a blanket primary, voters may cast primary votes for any
candidate from any party for any office. Thus, in a blanket primary, a
voter may be most interested in the question of who will be the
Democratic nominee for governor, and cast her primary vote for
governor for the Democratic primary; but most interested in the
Republican nominee for Attorney–General, and cast her primary vote
for the attorney–general race for the Republican primary. Under a
blanket primary a voter may influence any matrix of primary races
without limit as to party (though may only support one candidate per
position); under an open primary, may influence any party regardless of
voter affiliation, but a voter may only influence one party; and under a
closed primary must have a formal voter affiliation with the party in
order to participate.46 There are further variations on these as well; a
so-called modified blanket primary, for example, allows voters to pick
freely among candidates regardless of party affiliation, and then the top
two candidates for an office advance to the final electoral round (even if
both are from the same party).47
The Supreme Court’s first discussion 48 on the topic was in Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut,49 which queried if a state law could
mandate closed primaries, when a state party wishes to allow
independent voters to participate in its primaries. In deeming the law
to be an impermissible infringement of associational rights, the Court
provided its clearest articulation yet of the currently dominant
constitutional principle with regards to regulation of state primaries:
45. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 576 n. 6 (2000).
46. See Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built
by Judges, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 638 (2011).
47. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
48. Ironically enough, a decade prior to Tashjian, the Supreme Court summarily
upheld the same statute against a challenge by an independent voter; the key being in
that case the Republican Party and state government agreed regarding the desirability of
a closed primary. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily aff’d,
429 U.S. 989 (1976).
49. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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persons (and the parties they comprise) have a right to define the terms
of their own association.50 The majority opinion worked through and
dismissed the force of the state interests (such as anti-raiding or clarity
of party labels),51 largely because it saw the measure at issue as trying
to overdetermine the Republican Party’s right to determine the terms of
its own composition rather than as serving a universal interest in
advancing functional state politics. Yet the Court’s judgment regarding
the interests advanced by the state ultimately hung upon its
substantive assessment of political realities: can voters be misled by
party labels?52 Is there a concrete and material benefit to mandated
closed primaries?53 These are precisely the types of substantive
concerns that the Court has acknowledged when permitting restrictions
to stand (as in Storer, Rosario, and Jenness), and which are part of a
broader query into the necessary terms for legitimate democratic
politics. In readily dismissing them in Tashjian, the Court affirmed its
protectiveness of party self-determination, understood through the
associational right. 54
At the beginning of the 2000s, another wave of cases regarding state
regulation of voter affiliation and primary participation worked its way
through the Supreme Court. In California Democratic Party v. Jones,55
a state law (approved by referendum) dictated blanket primaries, with
the explicit goal of encouraging moderation of political views as
candidates drifted towards the mean to appeal to all voters. 56 In finding
the measure unconstitutional, the Court indicated that the “right to
exclude” (in this case, non-party members) in the nomination process is
a central aspect of the right to association. 57 The various structural
interests asserted by those advocating for the measure were dismissed
as lacking constitutional heft, especially given the lack of narrow
tailoring in the measure.58 Together with Tashjian, it establishes a
general right of parties to determine their own composition; 59 whether
it is by preferring a more expansive or more restrictive approach to
50. Id. at 215–16.
51. Id. at 219–24.
52. Id. at 220.
53. Id. at 223–24.
54. Id. at 229.
55. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
56. Id. at 570.
57. Id. at 575–76.
58. Id. at 585–86.
59. That parties truly deserve such constitutional protection (as if they were voters
who could suffer government oppression) has been critiqued. See Richard L. Hasen, Do the
Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 815 (2001).
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determining the content of the party’s identity, it is fundamentally the
right of those who comprise the association, not the government. This
right is not absolute, however. In Clingman v. Beaver,60 the Court
refused to strike down a state statute requiring a semi-closed primary
(ostensibly justified by typical anti-raiding and anti-fragmentation
rationales).61 Voters registered as independents were permitted to vote
in any primary they wished, but voters registered with a party could
only vote in that party’s primary. The Court concluded that (in contrast
with the mandated closed primary at issue in Tashjian) the burden on
association was relatively light, especially since parties could still
recruit and communicate with voters freely, thus determining terms of
their own association. The only associational impairment was that
parties could not seek to associate, ironically enough, with voters who
had actively selected to associate with another party.62 Likewise, in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,63 a
state primary design that allowed candidates to self-designate as
whichever party they wished and then moved the top two vote-getters
to a general election survived a facial challenge brought by the state
Republican party. The Court, in effect, said that the only harm
suggested was confusion of voters, which, in the absence of evidence
such confusion was only a hypothetical possibility, was not strong
enough to activate strict scrutiny. 64 In the absence of such
constitutional burden, a state’s right to regulate its own affairs will
justify “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” 65 Washington State
Grange suggests the Court will be hesitant to invalidate a “popularly
enacted election process” that on its face imposes no heavy
constitutional burden, and has “never been carried out.” 66
Throughout the development of the jurisprudence, the Court has
made various postulations regarding the viable operation of politics as
well as appropriate norms of democratic practice. This touches on both
the explicit constitutional weighting and the assessments of the various
burdens, as well as the interpretation of countervailing state interests.
For example, the Rosario/Kusper pairing is based on a theory of what
level of preemptive autonomous action is appropriate for voters to

60. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
61. Id. at 595–96.
62. Id. at 589. One must also wonder if the fact that the challenging party was a
minor party was of relevance to the Court’s reasoning.
63. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
64. Id. at 455.
65. Id. at 452.
66. Id. at 458.
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sustain appropriate party coherence. Likewise, the tolerance of the
anti-splintering rationale advanced in Storer suggests intrinsic value of
party coherence. Most notably in the current law, the valuation of party
self-selection in the primary process weights rule-based group
coherence over collectively chosen rules determining terms of access to
the political process. The result is a functional, albeit fragmentary and
obscurely presented, political theory.
III. DRIFTING ASTRAY BY ASSOCIATION: PARTY PROTECTION AND ITS
ANALYTIC LIMITS
The political theory the Court has advanced in the context of
primaries derives from the interplay of two broad principles: a
constitutional right of voters (and thus, by extension, parties) to set the
terms of their own association; and the interest of states in managing
electoral process, which is, ironically enough, often assessed by if the
subsequent procedures facilitate the functioning appropriate terms of
party integrity. While challenges to a law are phrased in terms of
constitutional rights, even the state interests used to justify regulation
typically involve the same substantive enquiry regarding the impact on
party coherence and continuity. 67 The Court’s first broad forays into
primary regulation may have been inspired by a broad desire to
maximize electoral access and break down structures that impair
legitimate democratic expression (much as one-person one-vote sought
to generally protect a type of voting equality), but the sweep of the
Court’s analysis—and imagination—has narrowed. Its approach to
primary regulation has become dominated by one question—does a law
help or harm the ability of citizens to sustain parties as associations?
This narrowing has had two substantive effects. The first has been to
clip the extent of jurisprudential analysis to only primarily enquire into
the effect on parties, rather than the broader impact on democratic
access and fairness.68 Correspondingly, the second trend has been a
drift away from the generality of fairness in democracy in the Court’s
reasoning. These two trends seem linked. The exclusive focus on
associational rights has resulted in legal thinking drifting from the
broader interest in political fairness that characterized the initial entry
into the political thicket.
67. See Clingman, 544 U.S. at 594–95.
68. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008); another
example from a related domain is Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,
359 (1997), which performed only an associational analysis to conclude that a state fusion
ban survived constitutional review, even as it cited cases invoking political freedom more
generally.
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This focus on parties (both as the primary locus of constitutional
interest, and as the primary basis for justifying a constitutional burden)
and associational rights is particularly peculiar given major parties’
structural centrality and political dominance. In an influential account,
Leon Epstein characterized parties as “public utilities” rather than
typical private organizations on account of their close and mutually
beneficial relationship to governance, their functional integration with
the public apparatus, and generally open-facing civic character.69 Given
the modern nature of US politics, it is scarcely possible to imagine it
operating without major parties possessing significant authority.
Scholars have further emphasized that the influence and stature of
major parties means that they are scarcely the sort of institution that
needs judicial protection from state action. 70 While the Supreme Court
has rejected protection of two-party dominance as a legitimate state
interest and indicated a (bounded) interest in ensuring that minor
parties retain some viability, its substantive and doctrinal concern with
association as the fundamental interest activated by primary design
mean that political parties remain the locus of constitutional protection.
And ironically enough, in Clingman, where the law was challenged by
minor parties as being especially disadvantageous to minor parties, the
Court was broadly unsympathetic (and cited political realities that
would be of greater benefit to a major party if they were trying to bring
such a claim).71
That treatment of primaries has come to service already
well-positioned and quasi-public major parties, which is particularly
paradoxical given that the ultimate purpose of judicial review of
election law is to protect the broader fairness of the democratic practice.
Earlier cases regarding primary regulation and ballot access reflected
this general political interest more strongly. This is elegantly
illustrated by the relationship between write-in votes and access to the
general ballot. In Williams and Jenness, the availability of write-in
votes was scrutinized by the Court in determining if an electoral setup
was so constraining as to be unconstitutional. This had a pendent
analysis in Burdick v. Takushi,72 where the Court upheld a state ban on
general election write-in votes because of the logistical ease by which
69. This terminology has been widely adopted by leading scholars of law and parties.
Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 750, 751 (2001); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil
Society, 75 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 493 (2000); Daniel Hayes Lowenstein, Associational
Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993).
70. See Persily, supra note 69; Hasen, supra note 59.
71. 544 U.S. at 594–97.
72. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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candidates could gain access to the ballot. 73 The Court in these cases
appropriately considered rights of both association and liberty. 74 The
underlying question was the viability of the measure at issue given the
broader configuration of the state electoral regime. In Williams and
Jenness, the constitutionality of restrictions on ballot access turned on
the broader ability of voters to express their preferences at the polls,
with the ability to freely express a write-in candidate being a pivotal
element. In Burdick, the constitutionality of a write-in ban required a
like contextualizing analysis, and thus considering accessibility of
access to the general ballot through other means. In constitutional
terms, the comprehensiveness of this analysis necessitated considering
how the regime impacted equal ability to express political preferences
for each voter as well as the effect on the ability of voters to achieve
coordination with other voters to maximize political efficacy. Thus, both
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection liberty and First Amendment
associational interests were appropriately considered.
Yet the generality of the Court’s review has faded with time, and it
has developed something of an associational tunnel vision, as is
particularly clear in the primary affiliation cases. This crabbed
constitutional view has led to neglect of the underlying question: how
should the expression of democratic will occur during the primary
process? Primaries are important precisely because, in a democracy of
large scale and with a dizzying array of candidates, some form of
pre-selection is necessary prior to general elections. The American
system has evolved to rely on the ‘public utilities’ of parties for this
pre-selection, with certain administrative facilitation and oversight
provided by state governments.75 Whether the primary process works
well is ultimately a question that devolves upon deeper questions
regarding the legitimate and effective democratic process; yet the
evolution of the law has somehow led to prioritization of associational
aspects of this question.76 Yet ironically enough the associational gloss
itself tends to benefit powerful quasi-state actors who are likely least in
need of protection from government action.
The distortive consequences of the Court’s proclivity for associational
analysis manifest in cases such as Lopez Torres, in which a primary
73. Id. at 441–442.
74. Burdick observed the “limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and to
associate politically through the vote.” Id. at 439.
75. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 162–67, for a description of the introduction of the
Australian ballot and how it attempted to curb some of the excesses of machine politics.
76. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 290 (2001)
(describing the emergence of a ‘structural’ view of the First Amendment).
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candidate argued a party’s internal selection procedures too heavily
favored insiders.77 The Court did not merely dismiss the claim (which
may have been a substantively valid outcome); it suggested that elite or
insider domination within a party is not a matter of general
justiciability.78 The wrong asserted by the claimant can only be so
readily dismissed if there are alternate mechanisms available by which
she could seek to achieve political self-actualization, not merely (or even
primarily) for her own end, but for the benefit of rank-and-file voters
whose political will might be overly channeled or constrained by elite
party control. Opportunities for genuine voter control of the selection of
candidates seems a crucial part of primary legitimacy; else the process
becomes nothing other than a means of elite conflict. The question of
Lopez Torres should not be if the plaintiff’s asserted harm can be
conceptualized as associational, but rather if she invokes a general
failure of primaries as an aspect of democracy that is appropriately
solved by judicial intervention.
Scholars have not been blind to the fact that the Court’s analysis of
primaries has been dissatisfying. Some have noticed the oddness of the
Court adopting a constitutional posture that protects parties, which, in
addition to being among the most powerful and politically savvy of
entities, have a uniquely close relationship to the state; as such the
Court’s drift towards rights protection that prizes party integrity, given
they can likely fend for themselves, is a curious move. 79 It can be
usefully contrasted with J.H. Ely’s influential argument80 that judicial
application of constitutional principles is justified when it protects
structurally vulnerable groups in a democracy; yet in a two-party
system, the major parties “are the dominant groups, and the Court
has . . . no reason to believe that they are incapable of fending for
themselves through the political process.” 81 Others have observed the
failure of the Court to consistently advance theoretical foundations for
their profoundly political intervention; Issacharoff has more specifically
stated the Court has omitted “any recognition of a thick right of
autonomy that a party may claim against adverse state regulation.”82
77. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 204–05.
78. Id. at 209.
79. See Hasen, supra note 59, at 815 (“courts generally should not protect the two
major political parties, the Democrats and Republicans, except from interference in each
party’s internal governance and from one party’s attempt to gain partisan advantage over
the other”).
80. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101 (1980).
81. Davis, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the related problem
of judicial intervention in partisan gerrymandering).
82. Issacharoff, supra note 76, at 288.
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These high-theoretical approaches have generally advanced
philosophical or social scientific principles as the new fulcrum for
judicial regulation of primaries. As advanced by Issacharoff, 83 Michael
Kang,84 and Nathaniel Persily,85 adopting postures that facilitate
effective party competition may be the most popular structural value,
though others have advanced more general models.86
Given that primaries are a fundamental part of the mechanism by
which individual will and collective preferences are transformed into
electoral outcomes, such a generally structuralist spirit is wholly
appropriate. Perhaps more curious is the broader acceptance of First
Amendment associational rights as the fitting lens for judicial
evaluation of such primary design.87 Even Issacharoff’s analysis of the
associational right with regards to regulation of political parties, while
recognizing the dilemma facing courts given that parties possess both
public and private attributes,88 does not challenge the basic reliance on
association rights. Yet for the reasons this piece has revealed,
associational rights are an odd foundation for considering party
primaries. Associational rights make parties the sine qua non of
assessing primary regulation, and tend to exclude other considerations
of how primary regulations impact democratic efficacy. Even if the
scholarly turn towards functionalist analysis is accepted, thanks to the
role of precedent judges would likely to continue to orient their analysis
of primary regulation around laws’ effect on parties. Yet this interest in
primary regulation is only legitimate as a facet of broader judicial remit
to advance fair terms for democratic politics.

83. Id. at 300.
84. Kang, supra note 38, at 1025, 1059 (challenging the purported anti-factionalist
benefits of sore loser laws by failing to give sufficient leverage to continuing negotiating
with primary winners during intraparty candidate selection).
85. Persily, supra note 69, at 753 (arguing for a functional defense of party
organizational autonomy on the grounds that it enhances competition and ensures a voice
for vulnerable groups).
86. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 796 (2000) (arguing for
particularized application of differing paradigms to address particular legal contexts);
Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131,
173–74 (2005) (arguing courts should adopt a more generalized structuralist view of
managing political conflict). For a review of these theories, see Michael R. Dimino, Sr., It’s
My Party and I’ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, and
the Freedom of Association, 12 FIRST. AMEND. L. REV. 65, 92 (2013).
87. See Persily, supra note 69, at 816 (“the First Amendment remains the most
legitimate source for analogous principles of autonomy and association”).
88. Issacharoff, supra note 76, at 294.
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The jurisprudence would be better served—in terms of both
substance and clarity—by starting with a right more generally oriented
towards popular autonomy, rather than autonomy as filtered through
dominant institutions in the political process. This is not to say that
judicial assessment of primaries should consist of unvarnished judicial
imposition of terms of democratic institutional design. Such an
approach would raise a host of problems, including problems of
standing and justiciability and contravening the political question
doctrine. More generally, it would threaten to turn the courts into
purely political institutions, which would both raise a theoretical
problem of non-democratic rule and expose courts to the risk of
institutional retaliation by the intrinsically more powerful legislature
and executive;89 both of these possibilities would weaken the rule of
law. Any such risks can be mitigated, however, by continuing to
interpret the legality of primary regulation through the matrix of
constitutional rights. The question, subsequently, is what right offers
the most appropriate framework.
IV. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT IN RENEWING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
PRIMARIES: A RETURN TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The most straightforward way to shake off the dogmatic focus on
associational rights is to turn to the Equal Protection Clause. This is
not the only right that could perform this function. Michael McConnell
has argued that the political thicket would have been better entered by
advancing republican government through the Guaranty Clause, 90 and
it might be possible, through a “thick” conception of political rights, to
adapt substantive due process to this purpose. It would also be possible
to stretch the concept of association to cover integrity of governance
generally, though this would involve distortion of the concept as it
stands in the doctrine. Yet “political” equal protection has a number of
virtues to recommend it: it has an established legacy in the regulation
of politics, including, before the Court adopted a narrower approach to
regulation, in the context of primaries; and it has a natural relationship
to the democratic process regarding the issue of how to assess the
appropriate government treatment of electoral procedure. Democracy is
distinguished as a political system by a commitment to a certain type of
structural equality of citizen political power. How this equality must be
realized has been the subject of a vast and contentious debate, but
before the court the principle of non-discrimination in the Equal
89. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
90. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–07 (2000).
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Protection Clause is the most natural mechanism for fully exploring
this.
Of course, many have observed that the attempts by the Supreme
Court to develop the Equal Protection Clause into a coherent vehicle for
protecting democracy have been theoretically underdeveloped 91 and at
worst practically self-defeating.92 One major aspect of the deficiency in
its judicial implementation has been what Heather Gerken has
suggested is a lack of mid-range theory:93 an explanation of what deeper
political aim or vision of democratic structure the Court hopes to
achieve through the application of one-person, one-vote. Indeed, in
Storer the Court seemed to concede the intractability of answering the
middle theory problem with its hand-waving denial of any
“litmus-paper”94 test for a state regulation (in the primary context)
passing constitutional muster.
Yet if judges and scholars wished to take up the challenge of
adjusting the Equal Protection Clause to address electoral justice, the
delimited role and structured character of primary analysis might offer
a helpful point of entry. Performing an equal protection analysis of
primaries would require juggling of a complex constellation of factors
and entities: the right of voters to realize their equal political
autonomy; the right of the state (as ultimately empowered by voters) to
set terms of self-rule; and the right of parties to facilitate the realization
of voter will, even as they often occupy a state like space in some
aspects of the political process. Yet that the Court would have to
explicitly take into account these structures might facilitate the
development of richer theorization of how the Equal Protection Clause
applies to political structure. In an opaque and fragmentary manner,
this has already occurred in the existing case law—while the Court has
overvalued the associational right to form parties and only developed a
partial account of countervailing state interests (which, themselves,
treat party integrity as the driving consideration), 95 it has at least
developed aspects of a theory of political operation in the context of
primary regulation.

91. See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: Mantra in Search of a Meaning, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002); Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in
Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002).
92. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (2002).
93. Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
94. 415 U.S. at 730.
95. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367; Clingman, 544 U.S. at 596.
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Thus, the very factor that makes primary regulation challenging—
the presence of multiple types of actors, one of which (the party) has
ambiguous status as both a quasi-governmental entity that can effect
unconstitutional action and a private association deserving
constitutional protection—makes it an appropriate candidate for
clarifying the role of equal protection in electoral design. The
substantive complexity would discipline the Court to engage with the
substantive questions that would answer the clamor for mid-range
theory. The treatment of association in the existing jurisprudence has
shown this will take place; however, the associational gloss has resulted
in less comprehensive norms guiding the law’s priorities. Equal
protection analysis, conversely, would require direct confrontation with
the question of the form of democratic equality that the law has so far
evaded.
There is arguably a deeper theoretical reason to embrace the Equal
Protection Clause to assess the design of an electoral practice as
important as primaries. While the principle of association certainly may
have first-order value, its greatest importance in the political sphere—
and the central importance the Court has assigned in its reasoning—is
as a tool for expressing political views. Due to its importance in
coalition-forming and view development, association is certainly
necessary for a large-scale democracy to function, and thus a Court
should protect it as a right. But the relevant type of political equality in
electoral process is both deontologically foundational to democracy, and
uncompromisingly essential to its realization. In effect, associational
rights are facultative of the democratic process—but equality is
obligatory. Of course, the Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee
general or universal equality; typically it protects against suspect
classes. The challenge with primary regulation—and arguably with
partisan gerrymandering as well—is that it seems difficult to classify
political status (whether party affiliation or status as a dissatisfied
‘outsider’ with regards to a given party) as a suspect class. Thus,
applying the Equal Protection Clause to primaries will require
significant conceptual innovation. Yet this is precisely the source of the
benefits of this approach. It would both force the Court to adopt a more
thorough and well-reasoned perspective towards primary regulation
rather than one that only protects a slice of the structural concerns, and
will likely push towards a more general interpretation of how the Equal
Protection Clause should be interpreted in the electoral design context
(a project valuable for partisan gerrymandering and one-person,
one-vote as well).
This innovation would of course retain protection of other
constitutional rights. When a government regulation overly impairs the
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ability of a group of voters to organize (or, for that matter, has racial
animus), it faces a high level of scrutiny in terms of the appropriate
constitutional right. Relying on equal protection as another standard
for assessing primary organization, however, will force the Court to
consider the broader political principles, and their more general
ramifications, it wishes to advance as an institution, and what aspect of
democratic practice deserve legal protections. It may also produce
conflicts between differing principles, as the advancement of ‘political’
equal protection and of associational opportunities might come into
points of conflict. Yet this is nothing new in election law, as is apparent
in the race-and-districting jurisprudence. In the case of tension between
equal protection and association, it could well clarify the ultimate
values which the Court ought to advance when plunging into the
political thicket. Indeed, as Ronald Dworkin would observe in his
analysis of hard cases, it is the very defining feature of judging that it
involves making, and justifying, difficult decisions between such
competing values.96
While the evolution of the law itself in response to the
re-introduction of the Equal Protection Clause might be difficult to
predict with precision—it is the job of the Courts, after all—two general
trends seem possible. The first is that a focus on equal protection would
force the Court to moderate its focus on parties as the sole locus of
constitutional assessment of primary regulation. Yet given that parties
in the two-party system are typically powerful, savvy entities with
sufficient institutional and structural resources such that judicial
protection may not be necessary, this seems like far from a problematic
development. Secondly, and perhaps predictably, a focus on equal
protection would unsettle some of the particular doctrinal outcomes. For
example, in Jones, the Court considered if a state could justify
mandated blanket primaries on the grounds that it would broaden
access to the relevant elections where a single party is dominant. 97
While it brushed aside the inability “to participate in what amounts to
the determinative election” by recharacterizing the interest in
associative terms,98 the question might be raised if equal access to
determinative elections might be supported by equal protection—
96. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1997). For a discussion of
the types of weighing that equality of political access and associational rights might bring
into conflict, see John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-settled” Law of Freedom of
Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 153 (2010); though the White Primaries cases might
bound how effectively, at least, major parties would be able to engage in discriminatory
association.
97. Jones, 530 U.S. at 569.
98. Id. at 583.
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particularly if other elements, such as a delay (even a moderate one) in
registration as sustained in Rosario are present. This in turn points to
the second possibility. A focus on equal protection might thus result in
greater approbation of certain types of political arrangements—though
the ultimate answers would require substantive engagement with some
political realities. For example, if blanket primaries ultimately did
unsettle or disrupt expression of preferences by impairing effective
selection of candidates in a two-party system, it might comprise an
equal election harm as well as raise associational concerns. But the
very need to face the substance that already so influences the
jurisprudence would be a virtue of greater reflection on equal protection
concerns.
V. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL POLITICKING AS BUSINESS AS USUAL, OR THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE COURTS?
An apologist to the switch to associational rights might argue that
the feature this piece has critiqued is, in fact, a virtue; it transformed
the Courts from an entity that simply worked at the margins of politics
to one that has the potential to reshape the heart of party contestation.
The engagement with major party politics that has accompanied the
associational lens allows the Court to act as a mainline institutional
player in the structuring of elections, and in determining the character
of parties. This is precisely the type of engagement that some of the
leading lights in election law have called for in both general 99 and
specific terms.100 If Courts are engaging with primaries to debate
appropriate conditions of party formation (as in Clingman, Tashjian,
and Washington State Grange), they are engaged in the meaty
questions of politics that allows for practical judicial structuring
(whether or not critics might agree with the substantive outcomes of
any particular such engagement). Conversely, the earlier,
equal-protection-question engagement had less direct substantive force,
insofar as it operated at the margins simply to prevent formal exclusion
(as in Williams and Jenness).
Underlying this argument is an acceptance of business as usual in
politics. As the Court has used the associational lens to regulate major
party politics, it has implicitly accepted the basic political structures
that dominate the contemporary electoral process. The relevance of its
99. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Law and the Political Process: Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 681 (1998)
(arguing that Courts should uniquely develop a theory of ‘partisan political competition’).
100. Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our
Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845 (2017).
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engagement as an institutional player in major party structuring is to
some degree premised on the dominance of such parties. To obtain such
immediate relevance, the Court must internalize the status quo.
Such a judicial posture mitigates the transformative capacity of
judicial intervention. By intervening in a manner that accepts the broad
contours of existing political structures, it minimizes the radical
potential of judicial lawmaking. This potential was, ironically, more
apparent, at least in principle, when the Court was deploying the Equal
Protection Clause to break up racial monopolies and ensure outsider
access to machines. Thus, even as the switch from the Equal Protection
Clause to associational rights seemingly allowed the Court to become a
more central player in the day-to-day struggles among established
political institutions, it may have defanged the Court of its ability to
introduce radically new principles or patterns into elections. This may
be because equality, compared to association, is itself an extraordinarily
contestable concept, and can serve as a playing field for fundamental
normative disputes.101
Thus, querying which constitutional doctrine should serve as the
Supreme Court’s lodestar in assessing party primaries may well lead to
a much deeper question: what is the appropriate high-level institutional
role for the Court? Ought it to enter politics as another agonist
participant in power struggles (a role that might raise concerns given
the emergence of the Court as a locus of partisan conflict)? Ought it
adopt a minimalist approach in the context of voting, as it seemed prior
to the voting rights revolution, allowing democratic struggle to play out
on its own terms? Or should its unique institutional posture lead it to
play a unique and occasionally disruptive (or rejuvenating) role in
politics, as it seemed at the inception of modern voting law?

101. For some examples of how equality can be a battleground, see, Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994).

